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Abstract. We investigate the role of ownership distribution in determining the extraction rates of oil 
fields. We formulate an empirical equation where the percentage stake of the largest licensee and the 
percentage share held by the largest shareholder in the dominant company enter as dependent 
variables. Our sample consists of 44 oil fields in UK Continental Shelf over the period 1997-2001. 
We use both fixed-effects and random-effects panel data models. The main results show that the share 
ownership of the largest licensee and the largest shareholder of its multinational company both have a 
positive and significant effect on the extraction rate. Moreover, we confirm the role of typical control 
variables: pay thickness has a negative impact on the extraction rate, while remaining reserves are 
positively correlated with extraction rate. The sensitivity analysis shows that our results are robust to 
alterative sample selections and model specifications. 
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1. Introduction 
In a competitive economy, share-ownership distribution should not affect the production decision of 
the firm. The reason is that all shareholders, regarding their characteristics, would agree on the 
objective function of the firm: profit maximisation. When a firm is not a price-taker, any changes to 
the production decision would alter the prices, and in particular affecting he households’ budget 
constraints. Those effects will have redistributive consequences among the shareholders (unless they 
hold identical shares) causing them to disagree on the production plan (in this case there is no profit 
maximisation rule on which shareholders can agree). A common way of reconciling shareholder 
disagreement is through shareholder voting (DeMarzo, 1993; Renström and Yalçin, 2003),
2
 where in 
equilibrium the decision taken is the one preferred by the decisive voter (typically the median in the 
                                                                 
1 We wish to thank Jon Gluyas for helpful discussions and two anonymous referees for helpful comments which greatly 
improved the paper. 
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 Shareholder disagreement can also occur if there are incomplete markets or if externalities are present. For shareholder 
voting in this context see Kelsey and Milne (1996) and (2006). 
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voting distribution). In this way the ownership distribution will play an important role (in particular 
the share owned by the decisive shareholder). Renström and Yalçin (2003) demonstrated that 
shareholder voting may imply overproduction as well as underproduction, relative to the efficient 
level, depending on the underlying distribution of shares. 
In the context of non-renewable resources, when the resource firm realizes it can affect its 
price by changing the extraction rate, shareholders will generally disagree on the extraction rate. The 
reason is that an individual with a share ownership different from the average wishes to manipulate 
relative prices of inputs. Thus, the link between shareholders’ interests and extraction decisions for 
non-renewable resources is of central importance in the literature on natural resources and has been 
little explored before. The only paper we are aware of exploring this link is Liu, Marsiliani and 
Renström (2016) that formulate a simple open-economy non-renewable resource extraction model in 
which individuals differ in the share ownership of a resource firm. The extraction decision is assumed 
to be taken by a decisive individual (the median voter in voting distribution). Given that the 
distribution of voting rights is naturally right-skewed, the median-voter share increases as the share 
ownership of the largest shareholder increases, keeping the same distribution.
3
 They take the share of 
the largest shareholder as a proxy for the share of the median in the vote distribution. They show both 
theoretically and empirically that if the substitution elasticity between the natural resource and labour 
is low, then the extraction rate is smaller if the largest shareholder holds a larger share.  Nevertheless, 
Liu, Marsiliani and Renström (2016) focus on firms’ resource extraction when each field is owned by 
a distinct single firm, ignoring multiple ownership or multiple licensees of the resource. 
Within the empirical literature, most of the existing econometric models of natural resource 
extraction are also concerned with aggregate extraction (e.g. Favero, 1992; Mabro et al., 1986; 
Pesaran, 1990), which may undermine the efficiency of the parameter estimates (Pesaran, 1990). The 
few attempts at disaggregating production focus on oil fields and mainly analyse extraction cost 
functions. To our knowledge, Livernois (1987) and Livernois and Uhler (1987) have been the first to 
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 The reason is that the number of shares owned by an individual gives the number of voting rights (rather than one vote per 
person). Thus, the median in the vote distribution will lie to the right of the median in the distribution of the population. 
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model costs of oil fields and Livernois (1987) the first to identify explicitly the role of geological 
characteristics as a determinant of costs of extractions for oil fields. Livernois and Uhler (1987) use a 
cross-sectional random sample of 166 oil pools in Alberta and find that extraction rate and number of 
oil wells have a positive effect on extraction cost. Remaining reserves is correlated with extraction 
cost negatively. Moreover, using a sample of 80 oil reservoirs in the province of Alberta in 1973, 
Livernois (1987) analyses how geological characteristics affect extraction cost in oil pools. Marginal 
costs including the marginal user cost of reservoir pressure are independent of the rate of oil 
extraction. The geographical factors of production are found to have a significant impact on marginal 
costs. Livernois (1987) finds that differences in the natural factors of production result in significantly 
different production possibilities among deposits under simultaneous exploitation.  
Finally, when analyzing oil fields, one also needs to capture unobservable specific 
characteristics which potentially influence the extraction rate of each oil field. To our knowledge 
Kellogg (2011) is the only attempt in the literature on oil fields. Within a learning-by-doing approach, 
he specifies these unobservable characteristics as the ‘relationship-specific learning’ through 
accumulative working experience of the producer and the driller. When the latter accumulate 
experience working together, relationship-specific intellectual capital is created that cannot be 
appropriated to pairings with other firms. Using a dataset from the U.S. onshore oil and gas drilling 
industry with a sample of 1354 fields and 704 producers and 1339 rigs over 1991-2005, Kellogg 
(2011) demonstrates that productivity of an oil production company and its drilling contractor 
increases in their joint experience. He shows that a drilling rig that accumulates experience with one 
producer improves its productivity more than twice as quickly as a rig that frequently changes 
contracting partners. As a consequence, producers and rigs have a strong incentive to maintain their 
relationships, and the data demonstrate that producers are more likely to work with rigs with which 
they have substantial prior experience than those with which they have worked relatively little.  
This paper aims at empirically analysing the effect of the size of the share held by the largest 
shareholder on the extraction rate in oil fields in the UK Continental Shelf. It combines relevant 
factors from the work of Kellogg (2011), Liu, Marsiliani, and Renström (2016), Livernois (1987) and 
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Livernois and Uhler (1987). Similar to Liu, Marsiliani and Renström (2016) we assess the impact of 
share-ownership distribution captured by the largest shareholder’s share, and the largest licensee’s 
share of the oil field, on extraction rate. Following Livernois (1987) and Livernois and Uhler (1987),  
we control for the effects of typical factors influencing non-renewable resources extraction rate, i.e. 
remaining reserves and geological characteristics such as pay thickness. Furthermore, as in Kellogg 
(2011), the heterogeneity across oil fields is captured by incorporating variables which account for 
both the geological features of each field and individual operator characteristics (i.e. the relationship-
specific learning through accumulative working experience of the producer and the driller) in panel 
data models. 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First in focusing on oil field we solve the parameter 
inefficiency problem first underlined by Pesaran (1990) in connection to aggregate production 
estimations. Furthermore, we provide insight into the production decision making process of oil fields 
when, in addition to typical influencing factors, share ownership is also taken onto consideration. This 
has not been studied before. Using annual observations from 44 oil fields in the U.K. Continental 
Shelf for period 1997-2001 we find strong evidence that share ownership has significant and positive 
effect on the extraction rate of oil fields. The results suggest that the more share ownership the largest 
licensee (or the largest shareholder) holds, the higher is the extraction rate of the oil field. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical model and 
describes data and summary statistics. Section 3 includes the estimation and related diagnostics tests. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results and discussions. Sensitivity analysis is given in section 5 and 
section 6 concludes. 
2. Empirical Model, Data and Descriptive Statistics  
Following the argument underlined by the relevant existing literature (namely Kellogg, 2011; Liu, 
Marsiliani and Renström, 2016; Livernois, 1987; Livernois and Uhler, 1987) the following equation is 
used to estimate the effect of share ownership distribution on extraction rate of oil fields: 
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where it
ER
is the extraction rate of oil field i in year t . 0 is the intercept. itSH is the 
percentage of shareholdings owned by the largest shareholder in the field.
 
itMSH  is the 
percentage of shareholdings owned by the largest shareholder of the responsive multinational 
company for variable it
SH
.
 
itRR
 
is the ratio of remaining reserves over total initial oil in 
place. it
Zlg
 
indicates the logarithm of pay thickness for oil reservoir as measurement of field 
size and therefore geological characteristics as in Livernois (1987) ,
 
ite is the error term for 
firm i at time t  and consist of the unobservable time-invariant field-specific effect i
u
and  an 
ordinary white noise term it
v
. As suggested by Kellogg (2011), the specific factor i
u
is 
considered as the relationship-specific learning through accumulative working experience of 
the producer and the driller as firm characteristics that influence the oil extraction rate for 
each oil field.   
To examine the effect of share ownership distribution on the extraction rate of UK 
Continental Shelf oil fields, we gather data from various databases. Table 1 below reports the included 
variables and data sources. 
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Table 1. Definitions and sources of the variables  
 
 
From the historical statistics and Brown books provided by Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC) of the UK government, we obtain the annual production and reserves for 
121 offshore oil and gas fields over the period 1997-2001
4
. We restrict our focus to oil fields. Hence 
those fields producing gas are removed from our sample. Moreover, data on share ownership the 
largest licensee holds is collected from Brown books.  From the Thomson One Banker database, we 
also draw data on share ownership owned by the largest shareholder of the multinational company to 
which the largest licensee belongs. Accounting for geological factors, the reserves of initial oil in 
place and thickness of the oil field are mainly collected from United Kingdom Oil and Gas fields 
Commemorative and Millennium: volume No.20 (Gluyas and Hichens, 2003) and supplemented by 
United Kingdom Oil and Gas fields: 25 years commemorative volume (Abbotts, 1991).  
                                                                 
4
 On the one hand, year 2001 is the last year which is easily accessible; on the other hand, the oil price is calm and low 
before year 2003. 
Definition
the ratio of annual oil production over recoverable reserves of oil field
the percentage of share ownership the largest licensee holds
the percentage of share ownership controlled by the largest shareholder of
the multinational company in which the largest licensee is belonged to 
the ratio(initial deposit - cumulative production)/initial deposit
net pay thickness in feet
Sources
ER, SH DECC historical statistics and Brown book 
https://www.og.decc.gov.uk/pprs/pprsindex.htm 
https://www.og.decc.gov.uk/information/index.htm 
MSH Thomson ONE Banker
RR, Z United Kingdom Oil and Gas fields Commemorative and Millennium and
25years commemorative volume edited by Gluyas and Hichens (2003)
and United Kingdom Oil and Gas fields: 25 years commemorative volume
edited by Abbotts (1991).
Thickness of oil fields 
Variable name
Extraction Rate (ER)
share ownership distribution of 
licensees (SH)
share ownership distribution of the 
multinational company (MSH)
Remaining Reserves 
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For each field and variable, we go as far back in time as the data permit. We then drop the oil 
fields that do not have complete records on three key variables used in our regressions, namely the 
extraction rate, share ownership of largest licensee and share ownership of the largest shareholders of 
the multinational companies. This leaves us with a sample of 216 annual observations on 44 oil fields 
for 1997-2001. The sample has an unbalanced structure, with the number of years of observations on 
each firm varying between 3 and 5.  
The dependent variable in our estimation is the annual extraction rate of oil fields, denoted as 
ER. It is measured by dividing annual production over recoverable reserves for each oil field. The 
recoverable reserve is defined as the oil that can be recovered from the oil reservoir, which is 
calculated by multiplying the amount of oil initially in place by the recovery factor.  
During a licensing round companies generally working together in consortia invest for the 
field on offer. According to the Department of Energy and Climate Change in the U.K., one of the 
consortium companies (generally the company with the largest interest in a field) takes responsibility 
for operating the field under the control of a joint operating committee of all the licensees. To 
examine the impact of share ownership (SH) to extraction, we use the share ownership that the largest 
licensee holds. Meanwhile, we also consider the role of the multinational company to which the 
largest licensee belongs (MSH). For instance, for one oil field named Andrew, its largest licensee is 
BP Exploration Operating Company Limited. In addition, to explore the effect of the largest licensee 
on extraction, we would identify if its parent firm, BP plc, affects the extraction decision of the oil 
field. The relating multinational companies list for each oil field is available from the authors on 
request.  
. The variable of remaining reserves is treated as a controllable factor of production and 
denoted by RR. Following Livernois and Uhler (1987), it is calculated as
( ) /it i it iRR S Y S  , where 
iS  is the initial reserves in place and t
Y
 
is cumulative extraction before year t . It accounts for the 
factors of initial deposit and age of the oil field. Pickering (2008) uses panel data and finds a positive 
and highly significant relationship between extraction rates and remaining reserves wherein 
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differences in costs and pricing behaviour are all contained within the intercept term. Therefore, we 
expect that the fraction of remaining reserves is positively correlated with extraction rate.  
Moreover, the differences in exogenous physical characteristics would determine the 
extraction rate for oil fields. According to Livernois (1987), the production is increasing in the 
thickness of the pay zone of the reservoir into which the well is drilled. This physical factor is 
measured with net pay thickness in feet, Z, which is defined as the thickness of rock that can deliver 
hydrocarbons to the well bore at a profitable rate. It is computed by oil column multiplied by net/gross 
thickness ratio. The effect of pay thickness on extraction rate is expected to be positive in our 
estimations.  
The statistics summary of our sample is presented in Table 2. Below. Data are available from 
the authors on request. Our sample consists of 44 oil fields over 1997-2001. We have a total of 305 
observations for the dependent variable, i.e. annual extraction rate for North Sea oil fields. The 
average rate of extraction is 6%, and the range goes from 0 to 56%. The largest licensee holds 58% of 
share ownership on average. There are five oil fields owned by the licensee with 100% of 
shareholdings, namely Andrew, Cyrus, Highlander, Miller and Tartan. The lowest maximum for 
shareholdings is 20%. The share ownership distribution is apparently concentrated, while the relating 
multinational company’s share ownership distribution is dispersed with the average share ownership 
7% as well as a range from 0.0014 to 0.26. The statistics show that 70% of initial reserves are 
remaining in oil fields on average. The minimum level of remaining reserve is 29% and the maximum 
proportion of remaining reserve is 100%. Net pay thickness as the geological factor which impacts the 
oil reserve and production has skewed data. The average thickness of rock is 537 feet and the sample 
value ranges from 75 feet to 2135 feet. Thereby it is transformed into a logarithm with base 10 to 
achieve the data normality. Moreover, Table 2 also shows the paired correlation for variables 
estimated in our regressions. The multinational company is correlated with extraction rate of oil field 
positively and significantly. The physical characteristics factors, remaining reserves and net pay 
thickness, are related to oil extraction strongly significantly (p<0.01).  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. 
 
3. Estimation  
Estimation is performed using panel data techniques. On the one hand, it can address the panel 
structure of the collected data on extraction rate of oil fields. On the other hand, the panel data models 
can capture both the heterogeneity across oil fields and the heterogeneity across time periods.  
Our econometric analysis utilizes two specific standard panel data models: fixed-effects 
model and random-effects model (Hsiao, 1986). Each specific model stems from a more general 
model that captures differences across the various producers by incorporating an individual term for 
each oil field. If it is uncorrelated with the other regressors in, then a random-effects model is 
appropriate. The one-way random-effects model captures differences across the various producers by 
including a random disturbance term that remains constant over time and captures the effects of 
unobservable factors specific to each oil field. The two-way random effects model captures 
differences over time periods by additionally including a random disturbance term that is generic to 
all producers but captures the effects of excluded factors specific to each time period. 
 
Variable       Mean    SD 
   
Minimum Maximum Median 
ER 0.061704 0.066767 0 0.556317 0.034822 
SH 0.575081 0.224240 0.2 1 0.5 
MSH 0.078709 0.071028 0.0014 0.2576 0.0527 
RR 0.697046 0.185114 0.290815 1 0.697502 
Z 537.7958 475.6533 75.9 2135.182 337.5 
 
Correlation Matrix: 
   
  
Variable 
  
Variable               ER              SH 
         
MSH          RR 
SH 0.0785 
   MSH 0.1261** -0.1865** 
  RR 0.3171*** 0.0162 -0.1337** 
 Z -0.3413*** -0.2528*** 0.0107 -0.0632 
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If the oil field-specific term is correlated with the other regressors, then a fixed effects model 
is appropriate. It removes any variable that does not vary within the groups. The one-way fixed effects 
model captures differences across oil fields by estimating a constant term for each oil field. The two-
way fixed effects model captures differences over time periods by additionally estimating an 
individual constant term for each time period. Table 3. below shows a summary of diagnostics tests 
for regressions. 
  
Breusch-Pagan test statistics with 52.88 strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the variance 
of the residuals is constant. It suggests that the residual has a heteroskedasticity problem. Moreover, 
as the degree of multicollinearity increases, the regression model estimates of the coefficients become 
unstable and the standard errors for the coefficients can get wildly inflated. To test the 
multicollinearity, variance inflation factor is measured. Generally, if a variable whose VIF values are 
greater than 10, the variable could be considered as a linear combination of other independent 
variables. In our regression model, the VIF equals 1.1 suggesting there is no multicollinearity 
problem. In addition, the specification error is found as Ramsey reset test with statistics 4.04 at 
significance level below 1%, which indicates that the estimation has omitted variables. Finally, we use 
Wooldridge test to check the autocorrelation in panel data. We reject the null hypothesis that there is 
no first-order autocorrelation in panel data. 
In order to ensure valid statistical inference when some of the underlying regression model’s 
assumptions are violated, we rely on panel models regressions and apply the fixed-effects model and 
random-effects model (Hsiao, 1986). Each specific model stems from a more general model that 
Diagnostics
Breusch-Pagan test (p value )  chi2 (1) 52.88 (0.000 )
1.1
Ramsey reset test(p value )  F(3, 208) 4.04 (0.008 )
Wooldridge test for serial correlation(p value )  F(1, 43) 25.928 (0.000 )
variance inflation factor
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captures differences across the various producers by incorporating an individual term for each oil 
field. Thereby, to some extent, the specification error problem is mitigated. Finally, considering the 
above problems such as panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation and panel-level heteroskedastic error 
term, we correct them by clustering at the panel level. It will produce consistent estimates of the 
standard errors. 
4. Estimation Results and Discussions 
In this section, we report and interpret estimation results with alternative estimators shown in Table 4 
below. 
Due to the coefficients of time-specific factors showing insignificant in all estimations, only 
one-way fixed-effects estimator and one-way random-effects estimator are used. Model 1 shows that 
right-skewed share ownership distribution of licensees has a significant and positive effect on the oil 
extraction rate of oil fields. Moreover, the share ownership distribution of parent companies to which 
the largest licensee belongs also impacts the extraction rate positively at significance level of 1%. The 
greater the right-skewed share ownership distribution, the higher is the extraction rate for oil fields. 
Apart from the effect of share ownership distribution, oil extraction rate is determined by geological 
factors of individual fields proxied by remaining reserves and net pay thickness. The results show that 
the oil fields with more remaining reserves tend to extract more oil. Moreover, as we expected, higher 
extraction rate depends on smaller thickness of rock that can deliver hydrocarbons to the well bore.  
Although the pooled OLS model generates solid results, it disregards the expected 
heterogeneity inherent in the panel data. To exploit the heterogeneity across individual oil fields, we 
turn to one-way panel data models. If appropriate, the one-way random effects model is preferred to 
the one-way fixed effects model as fixed effects model precludes estimation of one key time-invariant 
factor: net pay thickness of oil fields. Much of the subsequent analysis focuses on this factor when 
examining heterogeneity across oil fields. 
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Table 4. Estimations of oil extraction rate: Fixed and Random effects models   
 
t values are shown in parentheses;* for p<0.10, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01; N/A indicates that a 
particular regressor is not applicable to the noted model; Time dummies are not included as time -specific 
coefficients are insignificant. In case of OLS only the values of R-squared is reported. rho is the fraction of 
variance due to ui. Panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation and panel-level heteroskedastic in the idiosyncratic error 
term are corrected by clustering at the panel-level.  
 
The one-way random effects model dominates the pooled OLS model according to Breusch-
Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test under the null hypothesis that variances of groups are zero. We 
find strong evidence of significant differences across oil fields as LM statistics equals 44.56 at 
significance level below 1%. Moreover, according to Hausman test for random effects, we could not 
reject the null hypothesis that the individual specific term is uncorrelated with the regressors as the 
test statistics equals 2.69 and P value is 0.442. Therefore, the random effects model domains the fixed 
effects model 
Dependent 
Variable 
 ER   
Pooled OLS 
Model 1 
Fixed Effects 
Model 2 
Random effects 
Model 3 
SH 0.047*** 0.008 0.046**   
 
(2.64) (0.36) (2.00) 
MSH 0.288*** 0.340** 0.308*** 
 
(4.96) (2.71) (3.90) 
RR 0.135*** 0.235 0.151*** 
 
(6.76) (1.43) (4.47) 
LGZ -0.068*** N/A -0.067*** 
 
(-5.53) 
 
(-4.00)    
_cons 0.102** -0.123 0.088 
 
(2.41) (-1.18) (1.49) 
rho 
 
0.538 0.348 
R-squared : overall 0.327 0.173 0.102 
            within 
 
0.109 0.492 
           between 
 
0.2267 0.326 
No. of  observations 216 216 216 
 
13 
 
Model 2 reports the estimation results from the one-way fixed effects model. There is a 
significant and positive relationship between extraction rate and the share ownership distribution of 
the parent company to which the largest licensee belongs. However, the share ownership of licensees 
and remaining reserves are found to be insignificant. Moreover, the appropriate F-test for joint 
significance of all the fixed effects – oil field-specific – confirms their importance at levels far below 
1% (statistic equals 5.14). Thus, the one-way fixed-effects model dominates the comparable pooled 
OLS model. 
As mentioned above, the one-way random effects model not only dominates the one-way 
fixed effects model but also the pooled OLS model. Therefore, we focus more on the random-effects 
model. Model 3 reports the estimation results from the one-way random effects model. The results for 
factors involving share ownership distributions of oil fields and the parent company of the largest 
licensee, the proportion of remaining reserves and the net pay thickness of oil fields are very similar 
to the pooled OLS results in sign and statistical significance. Inclusion of these oil field-specific 
factors increases the coefficient of the share ownership distribution controlled by parent company to 
which the largest licensee of oil field belongs, from 0.288 to 0.308. Moreover, the coefficient of 
remaining reserves also increases from 0.135 to 0.151. 
Overall, we find evidence that share ownership owned by the operator (i.e. the largest 
shareholder of the oil field is the operator) has a positive effect on oil extraction rate at 5% significant 
level. The largest shareholder from the operator’s multinational company shows a strong relationship 
with the extraction rate of the oil field at 0.1% significant level. In particular, when the multinational 
firm’s largest shareholder increases 1 per cent of ownership, extraction rate would increase by 0.3%. 
In addition, geological factor, pay thickness and remaining reserves are found to be strongly 
correlated with extraction rate.  
5. Sensitivity Analysis 
Using OLS as the reference point, the robustness across these models has been evaluated in model 1 
of Table 4. The results generated by OLS are consistent with our main results estimated by one-way 
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random-effects model. This section thoroughly tests the robustness of the results across sample 
selection and model specification as well as different estimation methods. Firstly, we test whether the 
results are driven by outliers by excluding various groups of oil fields from the sample. Two methods 
are used to detect outliers and influential points: the plots of leverage against residual squared and the 
partial regression plots. We found that field no.41 was a point of major concern. Then, we performed 
random effects estimation with the outlier and without it separately. Deleting field no.41 made little 
change in the coefficients. For instance, the most change is of coefficient for MSH and simply 
dropped from 0.28 to 0.25. Therefore, oil field no.41 did not affect the regression. Thus, there is no 
influential point which has a large effect on regression results to remove. 
It is interesting to test for non-linearities by augmenting the regressions of Table 4 with 
quadratic and cubic terms of the share ownership distribution. The relationship between inequality of 
share ownership distribution and extraction rate could depend on an oil field’s stage of development. 
We test for this by experimenting with different functional forms, such as including a squared and/or 
cubed term for inequality. We do not find any evidence for a significant quadratic or cubic 
relationship between changes in share ownership inequality and changes in extraction rate. 
As a further robustness check, we enquire whether the estimation method matters. Equation 
(1) is re-estimated using Feasible Generalized Least Squares estimator (FGLS) and OLS with Panel-
Corrected standard errors (PCSE). Both panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation and panel-level 
heteroskedastic errors are controlled. We estimate a set of regressions where the dependent variable 
(pollution emission) is regressed on the core variable (share ownership distribution) and all possible 
combinations of other control variables. The results are presented in Table 5 below. 
In comparison with PCSE estimations, results using FGLS appear overconfident. This 
problem is explored by Beck and Katz (1995) who attribute this overconfidence to time-series cross-
section data where the error process has a large number of parameters as the FGLS assume the error 
process is known but not estimated. This oversight causes estimates of the standard errors of the 
estimated coefficients to understate their true variability. 
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Table 5. Sensitivity analysis: alternative estimator FGLS and PCSE 
 
 
Note: a) robust standard errors are in parenthesis. b) *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10% level, 5% level, 
and 1% level respectively. c) Both panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation and panel-level heteroskedastic errors are 
corrected. 
Summing up, for most regressions, the coefficients of share ownership distribution variables 
indicate high significance with positive sign regardless of FGLS estimator and PCSE estimator. The 
results are again qualitatively similar to those reported in column (3) of Table 4.  
6. Conclusions 
This paper examines the influence of share ownership distribution on extraction rate differences 
between oil fields. Results based on data from an unbalanced panel set of 44 UKCS oil fields covering 
the period 1997-2001 show that there is positive relationship between the share ownership of the 
largest licensee and the largest shareholder of the largest licensee’s multinational company and 
extraction rate. It suggests that an oil field with more right-skewed share ownership distribution tends 
to extract more oil after controlling for geological characteristics such as remaining reserves and pay 
thickness. In particular, when the multinational firm’s largest shareholder increases 1 per cent of 
ownership, extraction rate increases by 0.3%.   
Dependent 
Variable 
FGLS  
AR1 
FGLS 
AR1 
FGLS  
AR1 
FGLS 
AR1 
PCSE 
AR1 
PCSE 
AR1 
PCSE 
AR1 
PCSE 
AR1 
ER (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
        
 
SH 0.024393*** 0.039632*** 0.020502** 0.041799*** 0.03773 0.059652** 0.028873 0.056044** 
 
(0.00688) (0.01096) (0.00938) (0.01132) (0.02837) (0.02346) (0.02651) (0.02551) 
MSH 0.199431*** 0.085001*** 0.121079*** 0.151949*** 0.338382*** 0.214831*** 0.272279*** 0.150215** 
 
(0.02837) (0.02321) (0.02761) (0.00255) (0.08585) (0.08025) (0.0895) (0.07507) 
RR 0.099261*** 0.156953*** 
  
0.085605 0.113648***               
 
(0.01321) (0.01587) 
  
(0.05573) (0.04359)               
LGZ -0.07576*** 
 
-0.09235*** 
 
-0.10038*** 
 
-0.10614***  
 
(0.00813) 
 
(0.00714) 
 
(0.03276) 
 
(0.02084)  
_cons 0.16696*** -0.06826*** 0.29417*** 0.040656*** 0.231309** -0.04443 0.322227*** 0.051624*** 
 
(0.02756) (0.01193) (0.02193) (0.00674) (0.1244) (0.03569) (0.05873) (0.01755) 
R-squared 
    
0.4887 0.4237 0.4620 0.3602 
N 216 271 216 276 216 271 216 276 
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